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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [REDACTED]
Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group

SUBJECT : Comments and Proposals Pertaining
to JSG Recommendation No. 18

1. In reference to prior meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the list of suggested items on physical security and personnel security, the following approach of the Working Group is suggested. Comments on counterintelligence will follow as a collateral program in support of the first two topics.

2. The security of overseas personnel and installations is the responsibility of the head of the department controlling the overseas installations. Security policy under which these operate are responsive to the various Executive Orders which pertain to these two fields, principally Executive Orders 10501 and 10450. In addition, there are certain laws in the field of internal security which includes certain categories of information. The differences in the security programs of the departments and agencies stem from the internal policies, the interpretation of various Executive Orders, the nature of the installation, the type of overseas program and the funds available within the individual departments and agencies. Heretofore there has been no single interdepartmental organization which has attempted to coordinate the overseas security programs and policies and as a result, there is a lack of uniformity in such programs.

3. As proposed in the suggested items of physical security and personnel security, there are a number of practices, procedures, techniques and programs which could be recommended for innovation, increased emphasis and greater support. These would tend to produce a higher degree of practical security in official overseas activities and would tend to correct or overcome inadequacies or weaknesses that may exist in present programs. Of particular importance would

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be a much higher degree of uniformity in security programs thereby producing like handling of information and problems under uniform practices and procedures. This is extremely important in the Intelligence Community from the wide lateral dissemination of intelligence information between the departments and agencies involved and the forwarding of portions of that information to overseas installations. A security weakness in both program and practice by an individual agency presents a security hazard to the community of departments and agencies having overseas programs and installations. There should be mutual confidence and uniformity in the security programs of the departments and agencies concerned; both from the standpoint of the dissemination of sensitive information and the conduct of personnel under the security program. In this regard, the report of the Security Committee produced in September 1960 concerning Personnel Security Procedures of the Intelligence Community in force as of 1 July 1960 might serve as an excellent basis from which to compare programs in these fields.

4. In the field of counterintelligence, NSCID No. 5 and DCID No. 5/1, 5/2 and 5/3 establish the counterintelligence/counterespionage policy and program of the Intelligence Community. The improvement of relationships between the counterintelligence program and the security program for security of personnel and installations is of the utmost importance and this represents an opportunity for a definite forward step in this area. It is suggested that the following approach be considered by the Working Group.

- a. The present knowledge which derives from the existing system of counterintelligence is not properly understood, utilized or developed by the security officials responsible for the overseas security programs and the security officers in charge of the overseas installations.
- b. The dissemination of pertinent information in the counterintelligence field from the producers to the responsible security components for the overseas security programs could be considerably improved. At the same time, the security personnel should supplement their organizational,

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research and communication systems to take the fullest advantage of counterintelligence information and take appropriate action on the basis of the information.

- c. The security officers of the individual departments and agencies responsible for the overseas security program and the security officers in charge of overseas installations obtain, develop and exploit to a certain degree, a considerable amount of counterintelligence information in the course of their daily duties. Such information, however, is frequently maintained within the confidence of the agency itself and is not disseminated to a sufficient degree to other departments and agencies having overseas installations and faced with the same or related counterintelligence problems. The reluctance to disseminate such information frequently results from the involvement of an officer or employee of the department or an incident affecting the procedures or controls of that department. It is felt that more such counterintelligence information could be properly sanitized and reported for the benefit of other agencies and departments. It would appear obvious that a full reporting is desirable of the techniques, operations, provocations, blackmail attempts, penetration attempts, subversion attempts and all such actions by hostile elements seeking to compromise U. S. Government installations, personnel or security procedures pertinent thereto.
- d. There is a serious need by security personnel of the departments and agencies for country studies setting forth the capability of the local government and other forces to mount operations against U. S. installations and personnel. Such studies would permit security officials to relate their security programs in a more effective manner and certainly direct their efforts against the capability of the

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local threat. Studies of this nature can be produced by the CIA and by the security components of the individual departments and agencies based on their experience in these fields. Frequently, a single case or incident serves as an excellent example by which local hostile capabilities and techniques can be reported and disseminated.

- e. It is envisioned that in the above suggestions there would be a much greater flow of counterintelligence information between the users and the producers and if properly exploited should result in a considerable improvement in the security program.

5. The proposal to expand the Security Committee into the Counterintelligence and Security Committee is clearly contrary to the present policies of the USIB and does not serve to answer in a practical way the need for improving the relationship of counterintelligence to the security program. The counterintelligence program is in existence and it is more a case of dissemination and proper utilization of the information by security officials. The Security Committee cannot "take over" counterintelligence functions but it certainly can serve to increase the flow of CIA information, promote to the utmost use and propose more professionalism in meeting the security threat in overseas installations.

SIGNED


Deputy Director of Security

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